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Abstract— With an increasing demand for online privacy, 
most mainstream Internet browsing applications now offer a 
service to prevent the local storage of browsing metadata. 
Termed ‘private browsing’, this functionality has attracted much 
attention, both from the media and academic scientific research 
communities. The effectiveness of these privacy services has been 
frequently examined by digital forensic evaluative studies, 
revealing varying degrees of ‘privacy leaks’ and even now, after 
over 10 years of development, reports reveal apparent 
weaknesses in some services of this type. This article presents a 
process-level examination to establish what is occurring on a 
local system during a private browsing session, with a focus on 
Chrome’s Incognito mode. Interactions associated with Incognito 
mode’s system process are identified to demonstrate how 
Chrome’s Incognito mode browser window interacts with the 
operating system and where local-disk-writes are occurring.    
Keywords— Digital Forensics; Private Browsing; Internet; 
Investigation.   
I.  INTRODUCTION  
As individuals become increasingly aware of their online 
footprint, an increase in the usage of privacy enhancing 
technologies is being witnessed [1]. One such provision is 
private browsing (PB), a function adopted by most mainstream 
browsing applications, designed to provide local system 
anonymity is now well utilized. Regardless of the terminology 
used, (‘Incognito mode’ in Chrome, ‘private browsing’ in 
Mozilla Firefox, ‘InPrivate browsing’ in Microsoft’s Edge), the 
overarching goal remains the same, to prevent a user’s online 
actions being stored on their device, essentially removing or 
preventing user activity from being discovered by others. 
The private browsing functionality of mainstream browsers 
has been subject to scrutiny, both by academic research (see 
[8]; [5]; [9] and [3]) and the media (see [2] and [12]) in order to 
establish the effectiveness of the privacy offered by these 
services. Results differ, yet commonly physical memory and 
associated disk structures (Hiberfil.sys and Pagefile.sys) are 
highlighted as key areas for analysis [13][15], with variable 
degrees of success regarding the identification of evidential 
metadata found on the local disk drive [14]. Whilst most 
research focusing on testing the privacy functionality of a 
browsing application involves demonstrating whether browsing 
metadata can be subsequently found on a system, post-
browsing session, this article centers on examining the 
behavior of the private browsing applications process. Focus is 
maintained on Google Chrome’s ‘Incognito’ window 
functionality and an analysis of how the application’s 
underlying process interacts with the operating system. 
Through an analysis of underlying process behavior, an 
understanding how Chrome’s Incognito is functioning is 
obtained to establish how it maintains its local privacy, and, 
evaluate the potential for any browsing information leaks.  
II. A CLOSER LOOK AT CHROME 
Google’s Chrome Internet browser is recorded as being the 
most widely used to access online content ([10]; [11]) and as a 
result, will be subject to investigation within this paper. As 
with all mainstream browsers, Chrome offers a privacy mode 
for users. To enter this private browsing mode, termed 
‘Incognito’, users can, at any point during a normal browsing 
session, press Ctrl+Shift+N to trigger the creation of an 
Incognito browsing window. Alternatively, users can opt to 
open an Incognito session to commence a browsing sessions 
by right clicking on a Google Chrome icon if it is pinned to 
the Windows taskbar (see Fig.1.). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.1. Initiating an Incognito session from right clicking on 
Chrome’s icon when pinned to taskbar. 
 
Only online browsing carried out via an Incognito window 
remain private. To establish the extent of the privacy offered 
by Chrome, Google’s privacy policy states “Incognito mode in 
Chrome is a temporary browsing mode. It ensures that you 
don’t leave browsing history and cookies on your computer. 
The browsing history and cookies are deleted only once you 
have closed the last incognito window. Incognito mode cannot 
make you invisible on the internet. Websites that you navigate 
to may record your visits. Going incognito doesn’t hide your 
browsing from your employer, your internet service provider, 
or the websites you visit” [4]. Google’s terms present a 
standard representation of most private browsing services, 
where there is an expectation that privacy is only extended as 
far as the local storage device.  
2.1 Incognito Analysis 
When attempting to establish the footprint on an operating 
system left behind by an application or service, it is common 
practice to carry out unique test actions, followed by a search 
of the storage media for any remaining traces of these acts. 
Existing approaches for the analysis of private browsing 
applications appears to favor this methodology. Yet, an 
analysis of an application’s underlying process and the 
physical actions that it carries out is often omitted. An analysis 
of process behavior can improve a practitioner’s 
understanding of how private browsing applications attempt to 
uphold their offer of privacy, and in turn, any potential 
vulnerabilities that could lead to opportunities for the forensic 
recovery of privacy leaks. Therefore, this article will focus 
solely on what an Incognito browser windows process does to 
the local system, with a focus on every time it writes content 
to the local disk drive, due to a perceived increase in potential 
for the recovery of browsing activity. 
As Fig.2 shows, Chrome maintains a parent process (with 
Process Identifier (PID) 6640 (in this instance)) and a series of 
associated child processes, which can vary in number based 
upon how a browser is set up, tab counts and plugin usage. 
This process information can be identified using Microsoft 
Windows Sysinternals tools (a combination of Process 
Monitor and Process Explorer, both available from 
https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb795 
533.aspx), and the process’s activity on a Windows system 
can be examined. For the purposes of the evaluation carried 
out in this article, Microsoft Windows 7 was utilized as the 
base operating system with Chrome version 55.0.2883.87. 
 
 
Fig.2. Chromes associated process profile as shown in Process 
Explorer. 
III. WHAT IS CHROME’S PROCESS DOING ON THE LOCAL DISK? 
To establish the actions carried out by Chrome’s process 
during a private browsing session, the processes 
characteristics were monitored using the Process Monitor 
application. One Incognito window containing one tab was 
created and its associated PID identified (the PID is a 
changeable numeric value and will differ with new instances 
of Chrome (for example, if a window is closed and 
reopened)). To simulate test legitimate Incognito browser 
usage, the web address http://www.sunderland.ac.uk/ was 
typed into the address bar and a request sent. Once the 
browser had indicated that the page was fully loaded (absence 
of any browser loading symbols), the browsing session was 
terminated through closure of the Incognito window, thus 
simulating the act of an incognito browsing session containing 
a visit to the above web address.  
 
Throughout each stage of the process, system events initiated 
by the Incognito window’s PID were monitored using 
Microsoft Windows Sysinternals [6] Process Monitor (PM) 
and Process Explorer (PE) applications (see Fig.3.). These 
system applications can monitor file system and registry 
information associated to a process. To provide a benchmark, 
the same browsing tasks were carried out using a standard 
Chrome browsing window (non-private).   
 
 
Fig.3. System events associated to Chrome’s PID captured 
using PM. 
3.1 Event statistics 
Table 1 provides a breakdown of the system events 
associated to the PIDs of the Incognito and normal browser 
windows. As shown, the Incognito window interacts less with 
the operating system than the normal window, where total 
system events (files system and registry; network events were 
excluded from analysis) were over 50% less. As would be 
expected by a service offering increased local privacy, the 
footprint left behind on the local system by the Incognito is 
smaller.  
 
Table 1. A breakdown of PID associated system events.  
Action Incognito 
Window 
Normal 
Window 
Total time span (seconds) 13.9184 8.9573 
Total process related system events 3589 7790 
File system related events 1603 5154 
Registry related events 1941 2586 
File system write requests 69 2412 
 
To analyze the results of Table 1 in greater detail, focus is 
maintained on the Incognito window’s PID-associated system 
events. Of particular interest are instances where the Incognito 
process has written data to the local device, as with any 
application offering local anonymity, writing data to the 
device may appear controversial, as in such instances, the 
potential to find this content during forensic analysis may be 
increased. In turn, to ensure privacy, this data would need to 
be effectively overwritten after use by the application.  
 
A specific process’s operations can be filtered by IRP 
function code (an ‘I/O Request Packet used to direct messages 
to device drivers containing specific information used to 
convey the status of an event’, see [7] for further detail). The 
IRP_MJ_WRITE function code denotes a write operation, and 
when filtered, 62 operations of this type were initiated during 
the testing period by the Incognito window, initiating data to 
be written to areas of the local files system. The location of 
these write events is shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. A breakdown of operating systems locations subject to 
PID initiated writes 
 
Path Count 
$Logfile 34 
C:\Users\***\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User 
Data\Default\Cookies 
10 
C:\Users\***\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User 
Data\Default\History 
5 
C:\Users\***\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User 
Data\Default\E12.tmp 
2 
C:\Users\***\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User 
Data\E11.tmp 
2 
C:\Users\***\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User 
Data\Default\142B.tmp 
2 
C:\Users\***\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User 
Data\25E7.tmp 
2 
C:\Users\***\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User 
Data\Default\25F8.tmp 
2 
C:\Users\***\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User 
Data\Default\History-journal 
2 
C:\Users\***\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User 
Data\Default\History Provider Cache 
1 
 
This test sequence was repeated to establish consistency, 
where a deviation in the number of write events does exist, 
and is likely due to the following factors. First, the length of 
the session that is being monitored. It is not possible to 
recreate the sequence of events to the exact millisecond (load 
time of the page, for example) every time, some deviation in 
the number of writes to the local disk is likely to occur.  
Second, the page itself, where requests to different web page 
address can result in different amounts of written data. 
However, consistency in write location does exist. Each test 
session showed consistent writes to each of the above 
locations, where focus will be maintained on the creation of 
.tmp files, due to the volume of data being written to these 
locations and the limited interaction that Chrome’s process has 
with other areas of the system.  
3.2 .tmp file creation 
Attention is drawn to the .tmp files created due to the volume 
of write activity occurring on the disk itself. All local disk 
write activity (except $Logfile writes) is recorded as occurring 
in the directory 
C:\Users\***\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\ during an 
incognito session by PM. During testing, on completion of a 
Incognito window browsing session (containing a single 
website visit), almost 0.39MB of data was written to the local 
disk (see Fig.3.).  
 
 
Fig.3. File Activity summary of written bytes stemming from 
Incognito Window process. 
 
PM’s write statistics indicated that five occurrences of .tmp 
files (noted in Table 2) in the ‘Default’ and ‘User Data’ (a 
typical location for Chrome user data to be stored on the 
device during normal browsing sessions) had a combined 
312,349 bytes written to them. This equated to 80.1% of total 
amount of data written to the Chrome directory structure (see 
Fig.4.).   
 
 
Fig.4. A breakdown of the number of bytes written to the five 
.tmp files. 
 
An examination of the ‘Default’ and ‘User Data’ directories 
storing the .tmp files immediately after the closure of the 
Incognito browsing session did not reveal their presence, 
either live or since deleted. As a result, the contents of these 
files could not be verified, however due to the volume of data 
created, it is assumed that information relating to the active 
Incognito browsing session may have been contained. In order 
to establish the reasoning for the absence of the .tmp files on 
the local system and to attempt to ascertain their potential 
content, process information surrounding the creation of the 
.tmp files was examined further along with events 
immediately after. 
 
 
 
3.3 Profiling the .tmp creation and deletion process 
Focusing on activity surrounding the creation of the 
aforementioned .tmp files, the high-level pattern of local disk 
activity remains consistent, and as follows. First, an 
IRP_MJ_CREATE function code is issued to create a .tmp file 
(the naming convention consistently throughout testing was 
three of four alphanumeric characters long, for example 
26CC.tmp). This is followed by an 
IRP_MJ_DIRECTORY_CONTROL query directory request 
to check for the creation of the aforementioned .tmp file. A 
request for write access to the file is then made, followed by a 
write to the file, which can contain differing volumes of data 
(see Fig.5). 
 
 
Fig.5. An example of the temporary file being wrote to. 
 
The number of .tmp files created and number of writes to each 
.tmp can vary, with the presumption that this is based on the 
content and amount of content (number of website artefacts or 
pages), which is requested via the Incognito window. 
However this assumption again could not be verified and is 
based solely on the timing of the activity (during the request 
for the website) and the volume of data written. Once writes to 
the .tmp are complete, Chrome’s process, renames the .tmp 
with a naming convention of ~##########.TMP where # is 
any alphanumeric character. During the tests carried out, this 
process occurs within the 
C:\Users\***\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data 
(where .TMP files are prefixed ‘Local State) and 
C:\Users\***\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User 
Data\Default\ (where .TMP files are prefixed ‘Preference’) 
directories. This is followed by an issued delete command 
through the SetDispositionInformationFile function and the 
file is immediately deleted in the next system event, on closure 
of the file’s handle. 
 
On average (generated from figures acquired from tests 
carried out), this entire series of events occurs within 0.009 of 
a second.  
 
On examination of the ‘User Data’ and ‘Default’ directories, 
the created .TMP files could not be located. Browsing 
metadata associated to the test browsing sessions carried out 
could not be forensically recovered from local disk drive via 
searching. As a result, this provides one of two possible 
explanations. First, no data written to the local disk within the 
.tmp instances contained the web address information of the 
sites requested during an Incognito session. Or alternatively, 
any written data by Incognito to the .tmp files is being 
securely deleted (although verification of secure deletion 
processes could not be acquired as the exact sectors of the disk 
allocated to the .tmp files could not be identified) on closure 
of the application. In this instance, Chrome’s privacy is being 
maintained by the speed in which this content is created and 
subsequently deleted. However, should this be the case, it also 
leaves the Chrome application vulnerable to privacy leaks if 
the applications crashes before deletion can take place 
(discussed in Section 5).  
3.4 A comparison of disk activity: Normal Vs Incognito 
As established in section 3.3, Incognito mode does result in 
content being written to the local disk both in terms of generic 
operating system activity and in the creation of temporary file 
content. To provide a comparison of disk writes between 
Incognito and standard Chrome browsing windows, both 
browsing sessions were compared. Both standard and 
Incognito windows were used to access five test website 
addresses (the same in each case) located on the University of 
Sunderland domain. In both cases, browser cache was cleared 
to prevent interference with the volume of written data. Fig.6. 
and Fig.7. document profiled writes-to-disk taken at one 
second intervals.  
 
The normal Chrome browser window wrote a combined 
16.7MB to disk in comparison to the Incognito windows 
4.7MB. Table 3 demonstrates the decrease in locally written 
content (in %, per website visit) when using the Incognito 
function in comparison to a standard Chrome browsing 
window.     
 
 
Fig.6. Disk writes created by Chrome PID for normal window. 
Website visits occur at intervals 5, 9, 12, 15 and 19. 
 
 
Fig.7. Disk writes created by Chrome PID for Incognito 
window. Website visits occur at intervals 3, 8, 13, 18 and 22. 
 
Table 3. A breakdown of % difference of written data. 
Visit Decrease in locally written content (%) 
1st  77.01% 
2nd  91.92% 
3rd  61.03% 
4th  53.24% 
5th 85.23% 
 
3.5 A brief comparison of Internet browsers 
In order to provide a brief comparison of disk-writing activity 
from private browsing processes, two additional private 
browser functions have been evaluated against Chrome’s 
Incognito mode. A comparison of Chrome’s Incognito 
function, Mozilla Firefox’s ‘Private Window’ (v47.0.1) 
function and Internet Explorer’s (v11) ‘InPrivate’ window is 
offered in Fig.8. with write figures described data in Table 4. 
To compare actions, each browser’s associated process was 
monitored for local disk writes when accessing five standard 
test webpages (a similar testing procedure to that offered in 
Section 3.4 using different test web pages), before closure of 
the session. All five sites remained the same for each browsers 
test to ensure that all processes remained as consistent as 
possible. Before proceeding to each website visit, the browser 
must indicate that each visited page was fully loaded.  
 
Fig.8. Disk writes created by Incognito, IE InPrivate Window 
and Firefox Private Window processes. 
 
 
Table 4. Breakdown of disk write figures (in Kbs) shown in Fig.8. 
Second Interval Chrome Firefox IE 
1 0 0 0 
2 106.8 0 18.4 
3 645.4 5.4 0 
4 212.6 0.5 0 
5 282.1 5.4 0 
6 415.9 6.5 212.3 
7 471.4 0 0 
8 320.1 1.7 307.8 
9 163 0.1 0 
10 188.6 1.9 349.7 
11 37.1 0.5 0 
12 540.9 0 2000 
13 353.7 3.5 0 
14 547.7 0 483.5 
15 293 0 0 
16 690.8 0 0 
17 379.2 0 0 
18 90.2 0 0 
 
Table 4 shows that both Chrome and IE write significantly 
more data to the local disk when compared to Mozilla Firefox 
during their privacy modes.   
IV. SUMMARY 
This article has examined Chrome’s process during an 
Incognito browsing session, identifying where local disk 
writes occur during a private browsing session. Yet the 
Incognito function maintained its privacy as browsing 
metadata relating to the browsing session could not be 
recovered. These results are consistent with existing research, 
where physical memory is indicated to offer a greater chance 
of discovering browsing actions carried out in a private 
environment [13][15].  
 
However, Chrome’s process behaviour needs further 
discussion. First, it is only hypothesized that the .tmp files 
created by the Incognito process may contain browsing related 
content, and this could not be verified. This is inferred from 
the combination of the location of the .tmp files on the local 
system, the timing of their creation and volume of data being 
written to them. In addition, the .tmp files accounted for 
approximately 80% of all data written during a test browsing 
session (shown in Section 3.2). As testing showed that the 
time between creation and deletion of the .tmp files was on 
average 0.009 of a second, validation of the content of these 
files was not possible. This article was unable to record the 
contents of the .tmp files for investigation. In addition, 
attempts to simulate an application crash (termination of the 
process during browsing sessions) which was appropriately 
timed to prevent the deletion of the .tmp files. However, 
should the .tmp files contain relevant browsing activity, the 
Incognito function is potentially vulnerable should the 
application crash before they can be effectively deleted. As a 
result, it may be the case that Incognito mode maintains its 
privacy by the speed at which it creates and deletes content on 
the local disk. However, further testing is required to 
definitively establish this. 
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